Nathália Caroline Faria

Transactions between coffee producers and the cooperative of certified and specialty coffee producers in the North Pioneiro do Paraná can be interpreted as an interesting economic relationship. Therefore, this thesis seeks to explore the transaction dimensions and respective incentives from the perspective of Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory. Although both theoretical contributions come from the New Institutional Economics, it is believed that the research can be expanded with other theories or even with the integration of perspectives between the other links in this chain. Especially with regard to transaction dimensions, coordination failures, inefficiency or efficiency of incentives, cost-effectiveness, competitiveness and monitoring mechanisms. For this thesis, the objective was to identify the attributes of the transaction and the behavioral assumptions between cooperatives and small/medium producers of certified/specialty coffees from Northern Pioneer in Paraná, as well as the efficiency of institutional incentives. The analysis took place through the chain of specialty and certified coffees in the North Pioneiro do Paraná, between cooperatives and cooperative members. The determination for the general objective was due to the fact that the world demand for higher quality coffees has increased significantly in recent years. That's because special/certified coffee consumers (Coffee Lovers) are increasingly demanding, making the market more competitive. In the past, the effort to maintain the supply chain of higher quality coffees requires qualified agents, from the adoption of monitoring mechanisms to incentives that encourage quality, in order to guarantee the production of the bean. Furthermore, the observed specialty coffee chain has coordination failures, which can compromise the development of the segment. For some scholars, the lack of transparency in commercial relationships between growers and buyers increases opportunistic behavior, discouraging investments in higher quality production from the perspective of the grower, reducing the volume produced and the competitiveness of local producers. In this sense, the relationship between agents is seen as a transaction permeated by monitoring mechanisms and incentives to reduce opportunistic behavior and failures resulting from information asymmetry. Regarding incentives, they are adopted for coffee growers to increase investments in quality and adopt production practices in accordance with consumer requirements and certification criteria. Therefore, the need to understand the transactions and incentives for quality in the coffee sector is highlighted. This study presents as a theoretical hypothesis the thesis that the specialty coffee producer in Northern Paraná is influenced by the specificity of the traded asset and by the governance structure, that is, by the economic efficiency of the commercial relationship in comparison with specific investments. To achieve the proposed objective, a quali-quanti approach was chosen, through the application of questionnaires and secondary data. The primary data were collected through a semi-structured questionnaire applied to 21 specialty coffee producers from the North Pioneiro do Paraná (cooperated) and responsible for the cooperative. As for secondary data, use was made of a database provided by the agronomist from Sebrae PR. For data analysis, statistical techniques of normality, correlation and non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon signed-ranks and t test) were used. The results confirmed the hypothesis of economic efficiency according to the proposed theory, by demonstrating that investments are necessary to increase investments in grain quality and that high asset quality tends to be traded by the hybrid arrangement instead of the market. Despite market relations, still prevail in the region. Therefore, the incentive mechanisms adopted by the cooperative are efficient when it signals to the coffee growers that investments in quality will be rewarded, despite the vulnerability of risks and the appropriation of value. It was also found that time variables such as cooperative members, substitute goods, information asymmetry, environmental uncertainties, asset specificity, price, monitoring and bags alter the producer's decision in relation to investments in asset quality. Finally, this study makes contributions by identifying that to reach the level of quality sought by the demanding market, the specialty coffee chain in the North Pioneer of Paraná must increase the transparency of information in transactions and signal coffee growers about compensation (monetary or not ) on investments in quality.