Odirlei Fernando Dal Moro

The present thesis tried to answer how the Theory of the Games could explain the relationship between the political parties and the funders of campaigns in the Brazilian democratic regime in the 2014/2018 phase. The theme is justified, among other points, by the fact that donations of election campaigns generally target higher returns and are paid by society through the corrupt practice of parties and campaign funders. Thus, the general objective of the work was to expose the possible rewards of the players involved, in this case the parties and campaign funders. From the point of view of the specific objectives, a historical rescue was made, as much of the Theory of Games as the published works on the relation between the parties and the financiers of campaigns. The assumptions raised were that parties and campaign funders, as players, established cooperative games when there was ideological alignment, political capital, an intention to collaborate among them, and probabilities of success in the elections. In addition, an analysis of the expenditures for campaigns to the federal deputy in the election of 2014 was presented. An analysis methodology was created and through it the results were presented, which pointed out that campaign funders get the best reward when they invest in winning parties and when they do not support losing parties. However, mixed strategies are adopted in multi-party regimes. In addition, the high amount of resources invested in a campaign broadens the rewards of parties, considered in this work as the Partisan Fund, as more votes for the election of federal deputies are won.